Paul Ducklin talks to world-renowned cybersecurity skilled Fraser Howard, Director of Analysis at SophosLabs, on this fascinating episode, recorded throughout our latest Safety SOS Week 2022.
With regards to preventing cybercrime, Fraser actually is a “specialist in all the pieces”, and he additionally has the knack of explaining this difficult and treacherous topic in plain English.
[ROBOT VOICE: Sophos Security SOS]
PAUL DUCKLIN. Hi there, everyone.
Welcome to the Sophos Safety SOS week.
Right now’s matter is: Stopping cyber threats – cease them earlier than they cease you!
And our visitor right this moment is none apart from Mr. Fraser Howard, Director of Analysis at SophosLabs.
Now, these of you who’ve listened to SOS Week earlier than will know that I like to explain Fraser as a “specialist in all the pieces”, as a result of his data isn’t just broad, it’s also extremely deep.
He ticks each cell within the spreadsheet, you would say.
So, Fraser, welcome again to the SOS Week.
I needed to begin by specializing in one thing that goes by the title of LOLBIN, which I imagine is brief for “living-off-the-land binary”, which is jargon for software program that’s there already that the cooks love to make use of.
FRASER HOWARD. Precisely that.
DUCK. And the large drawback for the time being appears to be that the most definitely LOLBIN, or the most definitely pre-installed program that the crooks will dine out on, for need of a greater phrase, is nothing apart from PowerShell, which is constructed into Home windows.
It’s out there on each model of Home windows as quickly as you put in it.
And it’s the medium of administration today for Home windows itself.
So how do you reside with out it?
FRASER. Precisely – similar to you described, from the attackers’ perspective, LOLBINs are good.
They both carry their very own knife to the struggle, and their knife would possibly look very completely different to all the pieces else that’s on the system…
…or they use a knife that simply occurs to be current on the system within the first place.
And that’s advantageous to the attacker, for apparent causes.
Any safety software program gained’t see some model new, shiny, unknown utility instantly being run and utilized in a part of the assault.
However instruments like PowerShell are already there – that’s when the video games start by way of making an attempt to work out, “Is it one thing good, or is it one thing dangerous?”
I want there was a one-line reply to how we detect malicious PowerShell versus benign, however truly it’s fairly a fancy state of affairs.
What precisely is the PowerShell course of doing itself?
On one finish of the spectrum, you would use know-how like, for instance, utility management.
And as an admin, you would select: “PowerShell, you shouldn’t be allowed to run in my setting.”
That’s sort of a panacea, in the event you like, and it could cease PowerShell being abused, however it could additionally break a lot of respectable exercise, together with the core administration of most Home windows machines right this moment.
DUCK. OK, so utility management is Sophos’s title for the power to detect, and optionally to dam, software program that’s not malware, however {that a} well-informed administrator may not need to assist of their setting?
FRASER. Precisely.
And it’s not nearly admins and their selection of “Which utility ought to my customers be allowed to make use of?”
It’s about fundamentals.
If you concentrate on safety, what’s one of many issues that we’ve been telling individuals for the final 5 or 10 years?
“Patch!”
For those who’re an administrator and also you’re permitting anyone to make use of no matter utility they need for his or her browser, that’s possibly 5 to 10 completely different browsers that you need to patch.
Truly, for admins, applied sciences like utility management allow them to slim that risk floor.
DUCK. However PowerShell… some individuals say, “Oh, simply block PowerShell. Block all .PS1 information. Job achieved.”
FRASER. It’s not fairly so simple as that!
DUCK. Might a sysadmin handle with out PowerShell in a contemporary Home windows community?
FRASER. [PAUSE] No.
[LAUGHTER]
I imply, there are coverage choices that they might select to solely permit sure signed scripts, for instance, to be run.
However there’s an entire number of ideas and methods that the attackers know that attempt to bypass these mechanisms as effectively.
Among the older scripting engines… one of the best instance is Home windows Scripting Host – most individuals don’t realize it’s there.
It’s not the one-stop store for admin that PowerShell is, however WSCRIPT and CSCRIPT…
…these binaries, once more, are on each single Home windows field.
They’re much more possible to outright block, they usually get abused, once more by malware.
DUCK. So the Home windows Scripting Host contains issues like JavaScript (not operating in your browser, exterior your browser), and good outdated Visible Primary Script?
FRASER. There’s an entire host of them.
DUCK. Now, Visible Primary script is discontinued by Microsoft, isn’t it?
But it surely’s nonetheless supported and nonetheless very broadly used?
FRASER. It’s very fashionable with the Unhealthy Guys, sure.
And it’s not simply scripting engines.
I can’t bear in mind precisely what number of binaries are on a few of the essential LOLBIN lists which can be on the market.
With the suitable mixture of switches, swiftly, a binary that you just would possibly use to handle, for instance, certificates domestically…
…truly can be utilized to obtain any content material from a distant server, and put it aside to disk domestically.
DUCK. Is that CERTUTIL.EXE?
FRASER. Sure, CERTUTIL, for instance.
DUCK. As a result of that can be used to do issues like calculate file hashes.
FRASER. It may very well be used to obtain, for instance, base64-encoded executable content material, put it aside domestically, and decode it.
After which that content material may very well be run – as a method of doubtless getting by way of your internet gateways, for instance.
DUCK. And that will get even worse with PowerShell, doesn’t it?
As a result of you possibly can take a base64-encoded string and feed that into PowerShell because the enter script, and it’ll quietly decode it for you.
And you’ll even put in a command line choice, are you able to not, to say, “Hey, if the person mentioned ‘don’t permit scripts to execute from the command line’, ignore it – I want to override that”?
FRASER. You talked about .PS1 information.
That’s a bodily script file which may exist on disk.
Truly, PowerShell is fairly adept at doing issues filelessly, so simply the command line itself can comprise the whole thing of the PowerShell command.
DUCK. Now, my understanding is most so-called “fileless malware” does contain information, most likely various information in its operation…
…however there shall be a key level at which one thing you would possibly detect *solely exists in reminiscence*.
So, safety software program that’s solely capable of monitor disk entry will miss out.
How do you cope with that sort of state of affairs, the place the crooks have gotten all this semi-suspicious stuff, after which they’ve disguised the actually harmful bit with this fileless, memory-only trick?
How do you cope with that?
FRASER. One of many methods we cope with that, notably with reference to PowerShell, is Microsoft gives an interface which supplies us visibility into the behaviour of PowerShell.
So AMSI is an interface which distributors, safety distributors, can use to get a peep into malware.
DUCK. AMSI is… Anti-Malware Scanning Interface?
FRASER. Precisely.
It provides us a window into the behaviour of PowerShell at any cut-off date.
So, because it may be doing issues filelessly… any conventional interception factors that are searching for information on disk, they gained’t be coming into play.
However the behaviour of PowerShell itself will generate exercise, in the event you like, inside the AMSI interface, which supplies us the power to recognise and block sure forms of malicious PowerShell exercise.
The opposite factor is that, though “fileless” is seen as a little bit of a panacea for the dangerous guys…
…truly, one of many issues that almost all attackers are after sooner or later is what we name persistence.
OK, they’ve obtained some code operating on the machine… however what occurs if that machine is restarted?
And so their fileless malware sometimes will search to have add some stage of persistence.
So, a lot of the fileless assaults that we’ve seen truly interact, sometimes with the Home windows Registry – they use the registry as a method of attaining persistence.
Usually, they put some kind of BLOB [binary large object] of information within the registry, and modify some registry keys such that such that when that machine is restarted, that BLOB is decoded and malicious behaviour carries on once more.
Right now’s merchandise are all about an entire vary of applied sciences, from easy, proper by way of to fairly terribly complicated.
DUCK. That additionally helps to elucidate why individuals take information which can be kind-of the precursors of malware, however not overtly malicious themselves, add them to an internet service like, say, Virus Complete…
…and go, “Hey, no person detects this. All safety merchandise are ineffective.”
But it surely doesn’t imply that file can spring into life and begin doing dangerous stuff with out getting stopped…
FRASER. That’s an excellent level.
I believe it’s one thing the safety business has tried… however the truth that we nonetheless discuss it – we’ve most likely did not get this level throughout:
What’s safety?
What will we truly imply?
What does defending somebody in opposition to a risk sometimes imply?
Most individuals have a tendency to think about it like this… OK, they’ve a risk; they need a file that’s “the risk”; they usually need to see if that file will get detected.
However that exact assault… let’s suppose it’s a bot.
There may be 10,000 of these information *each single day*, because the dangerous guys flip their deal with and churn out a lot of completely different replicas which can be primarily all the identical fundamental factor.
And so the truth that 1, or 10, or 100 of these information will get detected…
…it doesn’t actually let you know very a lot about how effectively a product would possibly shield in opposition to that risk.
DUCK. “Bot” means software program robotic?.
Basically, that’s one thing that sits in your pc usually, calling house or polling some random server?
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. That server could change from everyday… and the bot will steadily obtain an inventory of directions, reminiscent of “Right here’s an inventory of electronic mail addresses to spam.”
Subsequent, it may very well be, “Here’s a listing of file extensions I would like you to scramble”, or it may very well be “Activate the keylogger”?
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. Or “Take a screenshot proper now, they’re within the banking app”.
It’s primarily an lively backdoor…
FRASER. It *is* a backdoor, sure.
And we spoke about backdoors 20 years in the past… I bear in mind doing buyer displays 20 years in the past, speaking about backdoors.
DUCK. “Again Orifice”, in the event you bear in mind…
FRASER. Sure, sure!
We have been making an attempt to persuade clients that, truly, a whole lot of the backdoors on the market have been extra necessary than the high-profile malware of the day.
What you don’t need to get contaminated with are the backdoors, which permit some miscreant someplace the power to regulate your machine and do dangerous stuff, reminiscent of take a look by way of your file system, or modify information in your system.
That’s a much more horrifying risk than, for instance, a self-replicating worm that simply spreads from pc to pc.
Which may get the press, and it’d trigger issues in and in and of itself…
…however, truly, anyone getting access to your system is arguably a a lot larger risk certainly.
DUCK. And considering again to Again Orifice in… what was it 1999? 2000?
That famously it listened on port 13337, didn’t it?
FRASER. You’ve obtained a very good reminiscence [LAUGHS]… sure, “elite”!
DUCK. And as quickly as individuals began getting onto DSL connections at house, and having a house router, Again Orifice was ineffective as a result of inbound connections didn’t work.
And so individuals thought, “Oh, effectively, backdoors depend on inbound community connections – I’m protected by my ISP by default, so I don’t have to fret about it.”
However right this moment’s zombies, right this moment’s bots – they name house utilizing some sort of encrypted or secretive channel, they usually *obtain* the directions…
FRASER. And since it’s on HTTPS, they principally conceal that community exercise amongst the million-and-one different internet packets that exit each minute on most house connections.
DUCK. In order that’s another excuse why you need defence-in-depth or layered safety?
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Clearly, new information – you need to study them; you don’t need to miss malware that you would have detected.
However the file may very well be harmless for the time being, and it might become rogue after it’s loaded; after it’s manipulated itself in reminiscence; after it’s referred to as out and downloaded stuff…
FRASER. And so, to get again to the unique level: how we measure safety merchandise right this moment is extra complicated than it ever has been.
DUCK. As a result of some individuals nonetheless have the concept that, effectively, in the event you actually need to check a product, you simply get a large bucket stuffed with malware, all in information…
FRASER. Commmonly referred to as “a zoo”.
DUCK. …and you place that on a server in isolation someplace.
You then scan it with a static scanner, and also you learn the way many it detects, and that tells you ways the product behaves.
The “Virus Complete” strategy.
However that: [A] will are likely to underestimate good merchandise, and [B] would possibly overestimate dangerous merchandise.
FRASER. Or merchandise that concentrate on detecting information solely, for the aim of primarily trying good in these kind of zoo-based exams.
That doesn’t translate to a product in the actual world that can truly present good ranges of safety!
In actuality, we block information… in fact we do – the file continues to be a vital foreign money, in the event you like, by way of safety.
However there’s a lot of different issues, for instance just like the AMSI interface that lets us block malicious PowerShell exercise, and a program’s behaviour itself.
So, inside our product, the behavioural engine seems to be on the behaviour of processes, community, visitors, registry exercise…
…and that mixed image lets us spot probably malicious behaviour for the aim of blocking not essentially a selected household, or perhaps a specific sort of sort of risk, however simply *malicious exercise*.
If there are particular forms of behaviour that we are able to decide are simply outright malicious, we’ll usually try to block that.
We are able to block a sure kind of malicious behaviour right this moment, after which a risk household that has not even but been written – in three months time, it’d use that very same behaviour, and we’ll proactively detect it.
In order that’s the Holy Grail of what we do: proactive safety.
The power for us to write down one thing right this moment that sooner or later will efficiently block malicious behaviour.
DUCK. I suppose a very good instance of that, to return to what we talked about earlier than, is CERTUTIL.EXE – that certificates validation utility.
You may be utilizing that in your personal scripts, in your personal sysadministration instruments, but there are some behaviours that you wouldn’t anticipate, though that program may be made to do these issues.
They’d stand out.
FRASER. They’d stand out, precisely.
DUCK. So you possibly can’t say, “This system is dangerous”, however sooner or later in its behaviour you possibly can go, “Aha, now it’s gone too far!”
FRASER. And that touches on one other fascinating facet of right this moment’s panorama.
Traditionally, EVIL.EXE runs; we’d detect the file; we’d detect some malicious behaviour; we clear it out of your system.
You spoke about LOLBINs… clearly, after we detect PowerShell doing one thing malicious, we don’t take away POWERSHELL.EXE from that system.
DUCK. “Ooh, I discovered Home windows doing one thing dangerous – wipe the entire system!”
[LAUGHTER]
FRASER. We principally block that course of; we cease that course of doing what it was about to do; and we terminate it.
However PowerShell nonetheless exists on the bodily system.
Truly, right this moment’s attackers are very completely different from yesterday’s attackers as effectively.
Right now’s attackers are all about having a purpose; having a function.
The outdated mannequin was extra spray-and-pray, in the event you like.
If anyone blocks the assault… dangerous luck, they provide up – there’s no human presence there.
If the assault works, information is stolen, a machine turns into compromised, no matter it occurs to be, but when the assault was blocked, nothing else occurs on the system.
In right this moment’s assaults, there truly is rather more of a human aspect.
So, sometimes, in a whole lot of assaults we see right this moment – that is typified by a lot of the ransomware assaults, the place the crooks are particularly making an attempt to focus on sure organisations with their ransomware creations…
…when one thing is blocked, they fight once more, they usually carry on retrying.
As we’re blocking stuff, and blocking several types of malicious behaviour, there’s one thing behind the scenes; some *particular person* behind the scenes; some risk group behind the scenes, retrying.
DUCK. So 10 or 15 years in the past, it was, “Oh, we discovered this brand-new, beforehand unknown Phrase malware. We’ve deleted the file and cleaned it up, and we wrote it within the log”.
And everybody goes into the assembly, and ticks it off, and pats one another on the again, “Nice! Job achieved! Prepared for subsequent month.”
FRASER. Now, it’s very completely different.
DUCK. Right now, *that wasn’t the assault*.
FRASER. No!
DUCK. That was only a precusor, an “I’m wondering what model of smoke detectors they use?” sort of check.
FRASER. Precisely.
DUCK. They usually’re not planning on utilizing that malware.
They’re simply making an attempt to guess precisely what safety have you ever obtained?
What’s turned on; which directories are included; which directories are excluded out of your scanning; what ambient settings have you ever obtained?
FRASER. And what we discuss right this moment is lively adversaries.
Energetic adversaries… they get a lot of press.
That’s the idea of the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework – that’s is actually a bible, a dictionary, in the event you like, of mixtures of ways.
The ways are the verticals; the horizontals are the methods.
I believe there are 14 ways however I don’t know what number of methods… tons of?
DUCK. It may be a bit dizzying, that MITRE grid!
FRASER. It’s primarily a dictionary of the several types of issues, the several types of method, that may very well be used on a system for good or dangerous, primarily.
But it surely’s primarily aligned to attackers and lively adversaries.
For those who like, it’s a taxonomy of what an lively adversary would possibly do when on the system.
DUCK. Proper, as a result of within the outdated days (you and I’ll bear in mind this, as a result of we each frolicked writing complete malware descriptions, the sort of issues that have been vital 15 or 20 years in the past – you have been speaking about EVIL.EXE)…
…as a result of most threats again then have been viruses, in different phrases they unfold themselves they usually have been self-contained.
As soon as we had it…
FRASER. …you would doc, A-to-Z, precisely what it did on the system.
DUCK. So a whole lot of malware again in these days, in the event you have a look at how they hid themselves; how they went into reminiscence; polymorphism; all that stuff – a whole lot of them have been much more difficult to analyse that stuff right this moment.
However when you knew the way it labored, you knew what each era might appear to be, and you would write an entire description.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Now, you simply can’t do this.
“Nicely, this malware downloads another malware.”
What malware?
“I don’t know.”
FRASER. For instance, take into account a easy loader: it runs; it periodically connects out.
The attacker has the power to fireside in some kind of encoded BLOB – for instance, let’s suppose it’s a DLL, a dynamic hyperlink library, a module… primarily, some executable code.
So, “What does that risk do?”
Nicely, it relies upon precisely and fully on what the attacker sends down the wire.
DUCK. And that might change daily.
It might change by supply IP: “Are you in Germany? Are you in Sweden? Are you in Britain?”
FRASER. Oh, sure we see that very often.
DUCK. It might additionally say, “Hey, you already related, so we’ll feed you NOTEPAD or some harmless file subsequent time.”
FRASER. Sure.
The attackers sometimes can have methods they use to try to spot when it’s us [i.e. SophosLabs] making an attempt to run their creation.
In order that they don’t feed us what may be the final word payload.
They don’t need us to see the payload – they solely need victims to see that payload.
Generally issues simply exit quietly; typically they simply run CALC, or NOTEPAD, or one thing clearly foolish; typically we’d get a impolite message popping up.
However sometimes they’ll try to preserve again the final word payload, and reserve that for his or her victims.
DUCK. And that additionally means…
…I glibly used the phrase “polymorphism” earlier; that was quite common in viruses again within the day, the place each time the virus copied itself to a brand new file it could principally permute its code, usually in a really difficult method, even rewriting its personal algorithm.
However you would get the engine that did the scrambling.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. Now, the crooks preserve that to themselves.
FRASER. That’s on a server some other place.
DUCK. They usually’re turning the deal with within the background.
FRASER. Sure.
DUCK. And in addition you talked about loaders – individuals could have heard of issues like BuerLoader, BazaarLoader, they’re kind of well-known “model names”…
..in some instances, there are gangs of crooks, and that’s all they do.
They don’t write the malware that comes subsequent.
They only say, “What would you want us to load? Give us the URL and we’ll inject it for you.”
FRASER. The unique bot operators from 15 or 20 years in the past – how did they earn a living?
They compromised networks of machines – that’s primarily what a botnet is, a lot of machines beneath their command – after which they might principally hire out that “community”.
It may very well be for distributed denial of service – get all of those contaminated machines to hit one internet server for instance, and take out that internet server.
It may very well be fairly generally for spam, as you’ve already talked about.
And so the pure evolution of that, in some sense, is right this moment’s loader.
If anyone has a system contaminated with a loader, and that loader is looking house, you primarily have a bot.
You might have the power to run stuff on that machine…
…so, similar to you say, these cybercriminals don’t should be involved with what the final word payload is.
Is it ransomware?
Is it information theft?
They’ve a automobile… and ransomware is nearly the ultimate payout.
“We’ve achieved all the pieces we needed to do.” (Or we failed in all the pieces else we have been hoping to do.)
“Let’s simply attempt ransomware…”
DUCK. “We’ve logged all of the passwords now, there aren’t any extra to get.” [LAUGHS]
FRASER. There’s nowhere else to go!
DUCK. “We’ve stolen all the information.”
FRASER. Precisely… the ultimate cash-out is ransomware!
At that time, the person is conscious, and the directors conscious, there’s information loss.
So, right this moment’s loader is nearly an extension of, an evolution of, yesterday’s bot.
DUCK. Fraser, I’m acutely aware of time…
So, given that you just’ve painted an image that clearly requires full-time work, full-time understanding – you’re an skilled researcher, you’ve been doing this for years.
Not everyone can provide up their day job in IT or sysadministration to have *one other* day job to be such as you within the organisation.
For those who needed to give three easy ideas for what it is best to do (or what you shouldn’t do) right this moment to cope with what’s a extra difficult, extra fragmented method of attacking from the crooks – one that provides us many extra planes on which we have to defend…
… what would these three issues be?
FRASER. That’s a troublesome query.
I believe the primary one needs to be: having consciousness and visibility into your organisation.
It sounds easy, however we very often see assaults the place the start line of an assault was an unprotected field.
So, you will have an organisation….
…they’ve an exquisite IT coverage; they’ve merchandise deployed throughout that community, correctly configured; they may have a staff of individuals which can be looking forward to all of the little sensors, and all the information getting back from these merchandise.
However they’ve a site controller that was unprotected, and the dangerous guys managed to get onto that.
After which, inside the entire MITRE ATT&CK framework, there’s one method referred to as lateral motion…
…as soon as the attackes are on a field, they may proceed to attempt to laterally transfer from there throughout the organisation.
And that preliminary sort of foothold provides them some extent from which they will do this.
So, visibility is the primary level.
DUCK. You additionally must know what you don’t know!
FRASER. Sure – having visibility into all of the units in your community.
Quantity two is: configuration.
It is a little bit of a thorny one, as a result of nobody likes to speak about insurance policies and configuration – it’s frankly fairly uninteresting.
DUCK. It’s sort of necessary, although!
FRASER. Completely essential.
DUCK. “For those who can’t measure it, you possibly can’t handle it,” because the outdated saying goes.
FRASER. I believe my one suggestion for that will be: if in any respect attainable, use the beneficial defaults.
As quickly as you deviate away from beneficial defaults, you’re sometimes both turning stuff off (dangerous!), otherwise you’re excluding sure issues.
DUCK. Sure.
FRASER. For instance, excluding a selected folder.
Now, that may be completely acceptable – you may need some customized utility in it, some customized database utility the place you say, “I don’t need to scan information inside this specific folder.”
It’s not fairly so good in the event you’re excluding, for instance, the Home windows folder!
DUCK. “Exclude C:*.* and all subdirectories.” [LAUGHS]
FRASER. It’s.
DUCK. You add one, you add one other, and you then don’t go and overview it…
…you find yourself the place you principally have all of the doorways and all of the home windows propped open.
FRASER. It’s a bit like a firewall.
You block all the pieces; you poke a couple of holes: nice.
You retain on poking holes for subsequent three years, and earlier than you understand the place you’re…
…you will have Swiss cheese as your firewall.
[LAUGHTER]
It’s not going to work!
So, configuration is admittedly necessary, and, if in any respect attainable follow the defaults.
DUCK. Sure.
FRASER. Keep on with defaults, as a result of… these beneficial defaults – they’re beneficial for a purpose!
Inside our personal merchandise, for instance, while you deviate from defaults, very often you’ll get a crimson bar warning that you just’re principally disabling safety.
DUCK. For those who’re going to go off-piste, ensure you actually meant to!
FRASER. Be sure to have good visibility.
And I suppose the third level, then, is: acknowledge the ability set required.
DUCK. Don’t be afraid to name for assist?
FRASER. Sure: Don’t be afraid to name for assist!
Safety is complicated.
We like to think about it’s easy: “What three issues can we do? What easy issues can we do?”
Truly, the fact is that right this moment’s safety could be very difficult.
Merchandise would possibly attempt to package deal that up in a reasonably easy method, and supply good ranges of safety and good ranges of visibility into several types of behaviour occurring in a community.
However in the event you don’t have the ability set, or the useful resource for that matter, to work although the occasions which can be coming in and hitting your dashboard…
…discover somebody that does!
For instance, utilizing a managed service could make an enormous distinction to your safety, and it might simply take away that headache.
DUCK. That’s not an admission of defeat, is it?
You’re not saying, “Oh, I can’t do it myself.”
FRASER. We’re speaking 24 x 7 x 365.
So, for somebody to try this in-house is an enormous enterprise.
And we’re additionally speaking about complicated information – and we spoke about lively adversaries, and that kind of assault.
We all know the Unhealthy Guys, even after we block stuff, will proceed to retry: they’ll change issues up.
A superb staff which can be taking a look at that information will recognise that kind of behaviour, and they won’t solely know that one thing’s being blocked, these individuals may also suppose, “OK, there’s anyone repeatedly making an attempt to get in by way of that door.”
That’s fairly a helpful indicator to them, they usually’ll take motion, they usually’ll resolve the assault.
[PAUSE]
Three fairly good items of recommendation there!
DUCK. Glorious, Fraser!
Thanks a lot, and thanks for sharing your expertise and your experience with us.
To everyone who’s listening, thanks a lot.
And it stays now just for me to say: “Till subsequent time, keep safe.”
[MORSE CODE]
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